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Abstract
Background: Some realists have criticised randomised controlled trials for their inability to explain the causal relations
that they identify; to take into account the influence of the social context of the interventions they evaluate; and to
account for individual difference. However, among realists, there is controversy over whether it is possible to improve
trials by making them realist, or whether realism and the philosophical assumptions underlying trials are incompatible.
This paper contributes to the debate in Trials on this issue. The debate thus far has concentrated on the possibility of
combining trial methodology with that of realist evaluation.
Main body: We concur with the contention that it is not feasible to combine randomised controlled trial design with
the realist evaluation approach. However, we argue that a different variant of realism, critical realism, provides a more
appropriate theoretical grounding for realist trials.
In contrast to realist evaluation, which regards social mechanisms as an amalgam of social resources and people’s
reasoning, critical realism insists on their distinction. It does so on the basis of its assertion of the need to distinguish
between social structures (in which resources lie) and human agency (which is at least partly guided by reasoning).
From this perspective, conceiving of social mechanisms as external to participants can be seen as a valid
methodological strategy for supplementing the exclusive concentration of trials on outcomes.
While accepting realist evaluation’s insistence that causality in open systems involves a configuration of multiple
generative mechanisms, we adopt the critical realist interpretation of the experimental method, which sees it as
creating artificial closure in order to identify the effects of specific causal mechanisms. If randomised controlled
trials can be regarded as epidemiological proxies that substitute probabilistic controls over extraneous factors for
closed experiments, their examination of the powers of discrete mechanisms through observation of the variation
of outcomes is appropriate.
Conclusion: While there are still issues to be resolved, critical realist randomised controlled trials are possible and
have the potential to overcome some of the difficulties faced by traditional trial designs in accounting for the
influence of social context and individual interpretation.
Keywords: RCT, Depth realism, Critical realism, Realist evaluation, Elision, Causality
Background
This paper is a further contribution to the debate in Trials
[1, 2] about the possibility of conducting ‘genuinely realist’
[2] randomised controlled trials (RCTs). However, before
engaging in the debate, we should clarify what we mean
when we talk about realism, and explain why we believe
that it can make a worthwhile contribution to evaluation
science.
Realism, in its broadest sense, is the belief that there is
an external reality that exists independently of human
perception. That, of course, begs the question of what
that reality consists of, and there have been many different
answers to this question, giving rise to numerous schools
of realism. As a result, talk of a single ‘genuine’ realism is
not very helpful. Indeed, to the extent that RCTs are
underpinned by Karl Popper’s post-positivist philosophy,
they are already genuinely realist. Popper [3] accepted
‘realism as the only sensible hypothesis (p. 42)… [W]hat
we attempt in science is to describe and (so far as pos-
sible) explain reality’ (p. 40).
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For Popper, the job of science was to pose hypotheses
about causal relations and then to test them empirically
to see whether or not relations of regular succession
could be identified between the hypothesised cause and
hypothesised effect. So, Popper’s reality consisted of
observable things and events. This variant of realism can
be described as ‘empirical realism’ or ‘actualism’ ([4],
p. 57). In contrast, the realism that is being referred to
here is ‘depth realism’ ([5], p. 42). The term reflects
Roy Bhaskar’s argument that there is another level of
reality underlying events, consisting of the mechanisms
whose powers cause those events to occur ([4], p. 56).
Bhaskar uses the term ‘mechanism’ to describe causal
laws to underline acceptance that their powers may be
latent and their effects contingent ([4], p. 49).
Among the benefits of such an approach, he argues, is
that it opens up the possibility of going beyond identifi-
cation to explanation, thereby enabling a more nuanced
understanding of why relationships of succession between
one event and another are rarely constant. In open sys-
tems, which typically have a number of mechanisms oper-
ating simultaneously, what actually happens will depend
on their combination. Thus, to take a simple example,
whether or not an object floats does not only depend
upon its mass, but also upon the density of the fluid it is
in. In other words, its position will be dependent on the
particular combination of the mechanisms of gravity and
buoyancy that pertains.
But why should it matter that RCTs are founded upon
a successionist view of causality? What is so debilitating
about basing science on an actualist ontology? Some
argue that all this philosophical conjecturing is beside
the point; what matters is that RCTs (and the procedures
and policies that they identify as effective) work. From
such a perspective, theoretical ruminations such as this
are decidedly unhelpful [6]. In a similar vein, Scriven [7]
argues that the realist aspiration to explain causal rela-
tions involves a fundamental misunderstanding of the
aim of evaluation, which should be purely about identi-
fying them.
Yet, while the RCT may be lauded as the least worst
way to gain accurate and unbiased knowledge about the
effectiveness of interventions [8] it displays generally
accepted weaknesses in its ability, for example, to gener-
alise to different contexts, to be sensitive to individual
characteristics, and to be able to discern the specific
effects of components within complex interventions
[9–12]. Strategies have been developed to deal with
these issues, the most notable being the British Medical
Research Council’s Framework for the Development
and Evaluation of Complex Healthcare Interventions
[13]. The MRC Framework seeks to supplement the
standard RCT with procedures that take complexity
and context into account. Thus, its pre-clinical and
modelling phases may incorporate qualitative testing to
enable investigators to describe the component parts of
the intervention to ascertain which are considered es-
sential and which can be adapted to fit with the local
context. It also recommends post-trial evaluation to un-
cover how context influences outcomes in order to aid
everyday clinical implementation.
Depth realists have pointed to the incompatibility of
these adjustments with the basic philosophical assump-
tions on which trials are based [14, 15]. RCTs are founded
on a conception of causality as the regular succession of
events in the form of stimulus and response. The addition
of human interpretation and choice that is implied in the
adoption of qualitative methods, along with an acceptance
of the role of context in explanation, undermines that
conception [16]. Conversely, if the validity and reliability
of RCTs is accepted, then individual perspectives and con-
textual influences are rendered superfluous.
From a depth realist perspective, the MRC Framework
might be seen as an instance of what Kuhn [17] de-
scribes as the ad hoc adjustments made to a paradigm at
the point when its inability to cope with anomalies
between its theoretical foundations and the problems it
faces is becoming increasingly evident [16].
Conversely, from a post-positivist perspective, develop-
ments like the Framework might be regarded as facilitating
a sustainable adjustment to the methods used to evaluate
complex interventions, enabling them to combine atten-
tion to the causative characteristics of both the interven-
tions themselves and the contexts within which they occur.
In other words, to return to the pragmatic assertion of the
irrelevance of theory, if the Framework works, that is what
matters, not its nonconformity to some obscure theoretical
strictures.
The depth realist response to such pragmatic objections
is that confusion in theory leads to confusion in practice.
If there is ambiguity about the relationship between quali-
tative and quantitative data and/or between intervention
and context, then it becomes difficult for researchers to
construct coherent explanations [16].
However, while depth realists may be united in their
dissatisfaction with RCTs’ concentration on the succes-
sion of events at a cost to examining the causes of those
successions, especially when RCTs are concerned with the
evaluation of interventions designed to change people’s be-
haviour, they are not agreed on the solution to the prob-
lem. Some regard trials as incompatible with depth realism
[18]; while others argue that it is possible to conduct trials
using realist assumptions [19]. The current debate in the
pages of Trials is located within this controversy.
Introduction
Our central contention in this paper is that realist RCTs de-
signed to evaluate the effectiveness of behaviour-changing
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interventions are possible, but only if they are founded
upon a different type of realist philosophy to that cur-
rently adopted by both Jamal et al. [1] in their com-
mendation of realist RCTs and Van Belle et al. [2] in
their critique of them. The common ground they share
is the version of realism that is found in the philosophi-
cal underpinnings of Pawson and Tilley’s [20] realist
evaluation. The problem for Jamal et al., as Van Belle et
al. point out, is that the assumptions embedded in real-
ist RCTs about the nature of causal mechanisms and
the processes of causality are inimical to those of realist
evaluation.
While Pawson and Tilley accept Bhaskar’s depth
realism, they reject his extrapolation of its principles to
the examination of the social world in the form of crit-
ical realism [15]. Critical realism, as formulated by
Bhaskar [21] and developed by Archer [22] and others,
regards structured social relations as possessing causal
powers similar to natural causal powers, in that they
are experienced by people as external forces that enable
or constrain how they act. The effects of these struc-
tural mechanisms can be seen in empirically observable
patterns, such as the association of social class with
educational attainment. However, unlike natural mecha-
nisms, with their wider range of influence, social mecha-
nisms act specifically on human beings. This is significant
because human beings have causal powers of their own.
They have the power to choose how to act on the basis of
their interpretations of what is the best course for them to
take. For example, it is perfectly possible (though less
likely and more difficult) for a working-class person to
attain a higher degree. So, for critical realists, the human
sciences have to take account of two distinct sources of
causation – social structures and human agents.
In contrast, realist evaluation rejects the claim that
social structures are separate, objective entities, seeing
social mechanisms as the latent powers and capacities of
individuals [2]. It is this interpretation of social mecha-
nisms as having internal, reflexive components that leads
realist evaluators to regard attempts to understand hu-
man behaviour through the identification of successions
of events as inappropriate.
In this paper, accepting the incompatibility of RCTs
with realist evaluation, we will contend that the adoption
of a critical realist approach, as defined by Bhaskar [21]
and Archer [22], reopens the space for realist RCTs. To
support our argument, we will present the critical realist
view of causal mechanisms as objective influences on
human behaviour as an alternative to realist evaluation’s
conception of mechanisms as combinations of resources
and reasons. We will also examine how critical realist in-
terpretations of experimental closure distinguish it from
realist evaluation’s position on the focus of scientific
research.
The critique of realist RCTs
In their commentary, Van Belle et al. [2] raise at least four
major objections to Jamal et al.’s [1] overview of realist
RCTs, which we will address in turn. Their first is that
Jamal et al.’s conception of interventions largely ignores
the role of human volition in behavioural change.
Secondly, they contend that Jamal et al. regard mecha-
nisms as external factors introduced into a social con-
text, rather than being ‘a function of the interaction
between intervention resources and responses of partici-
pants’ (p. 3).
Van Belle et al.’s third argument is that Jamal et al.’s
segmentation of mechanisms into discrete, statistically
amenable entities is inimical to the configurational ap-
proach to causation of what they term ‘scientific’ realism,
a descriptor which we interpret as analogous to ‘depth’
realism.
Their fourth objection concerns RCTs’ requirement for
randomisation and control, which means they have lim-
ited powers to deal with dynamic and complex causation.
Neglect of volition?
Van Belle et al. [2] take issue with Jamal et al.’s [1] de-
scription of realist analysis as testing ‘how the interven-
tion theory of change interacts with context’, arguing
that it is ‘not the “intervention theory of change” that in-
teracts with context. Rather, scientific realism holds that
interventions take place in specific contexts and address
actors, who decide (or not) to change their behaviour,
choices or decisions in response to the resources and
opportunities offered by the intervention’ (p. 2). The re-
lationship between the three main components
highlighted by Van Belle et al. might be best illustrated
by an example. In a realist evaluation of the Liverpool
Care Pathway for the Dying Patient [23], we noticed that
the effectiveness of the pathway (intervention) was
undermined by the withdrawal of educational resources
to train staff in its use (context), but different actors
responded to this challenge in different ways (agency),
with nurses tending to continue promoting the pathway
through informal education, while physicians were less
committed to sustaining it.
Van Belle et al.’s charge is that Jamal et al.’s description
of the engine of behavioural change confines itself to the
‘external’ causal forces contained in the intervention and
its social context, ignoring the capacity of people to
choose how to respond to those external forces. In other
words, it is concentrating on social structures at the cost
of human agency.
To the extent that Jamal et al. make no mention of
human agency in their description of contexts or mecha-
nisms, there is some merit to this charge. However, else-
where they include qualitative process evaluation in
their framework to capture ‘a sense of research
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participants’ own meanings, their sense of agency and
how this inter-relates with the social structure of inter-
vention context’ ([1], p. 6). While we would take issue
with the confinement of Jamal et al.’s analysis to the
connection between agency and context, and argue that
it should be extended to include the crucial relationship
between people and interventions, it is clear that their
model does address human agency. However, by analyt-
ically distinguishing agency from social structure, it does
so in a manner that Van Belle et al. do not perceive as
legitimately realist.
Resources and responses
Van Belle et al. argue that Jamal et al.’s description of
mechanisms involves a categorical error in that it
‘wrongly implies that mechanisms can be introduced
into a situation and are thus external; scientific realism
holds that mechanisms are not external factors but
latent powers and capabilities, which are a function of
the interactions between intervention resources and re-
sponses of participants’ ([2], p. 3).
We have to take issue with Van Belle et al.’s claim that
all versions of ‘scientific’ realism hold that mechanisms
are a function of the interaction of resources and re-
sponses, and point to critical realism’s contrary stance,
based on its separation of social structures and human
agency ([21], p. 79), that the mechanisms involved in
resources and responses are distinct ([22], p. 89).
Social structures
For critical realists, social structures possess generative
mechanisms that influence the behaviour of humans,
exerting ‘an objective influence which conditions action
patterns and supplies agents with strategic directional
guidance’ ([22], p. 196). They explain the objective in-
fluence of social mechanisms by recourse to a relational
conception of society which holds that it is charac-
terised by a matrix of relatively enduring social rela-
tions between individuals and groups (for example,
between men and women or employers and employees),
and that an individual’s position in this matrix will con-
figure their opportunities or constraints, and the re-
sources or deprivations that they experience. It will also
impose cultural or legal expectations for an individual
or group to engage in the practices associated with
their social position(s).
Human agency
Social mechanisms do not act upon inanimate objects,
but on human beings with the powers of reflexivity, rea-
son and interpretation. The significance of this is that,
when considering the behaviour of people, the additional
component of conscious intent needs to be added to
causal explanations. In many circumstances, people have
the capacity to choose how they respond to external
stimuli. This means, among other things, that their re-
sponses to their positions in structured social relations
will not be determined by those positions, but will result
from their reflection on the options that they have. More
specifically, it means that their responses to changes in
their position resulting from the introduction of com-
plex interventions will be a consequence of the choices
they make.
In summary, critical realism’s ‘analytical dualism’ ([22],
p. 15), whereby it distinguishes social structures from
human agency, entails a categorical distinction between
social resources and individual reasons.
Conflations of structure and agency
In her critique of approaches to the relationship between
structure and agency that seek to identify a unitary ex-
planation for human behaviour, Margaret Archer [22]
identifies three types of conflation. ‘Downwards confla-
tion’ is entailed in collectivist theories that place the pri-
mary causal onus on social structures and strip human
choice and agency of power. ‘Upwards conflation’ can be
found in social theories that insist that reality consists of
nothing but individuals and their activities, giving social
structures a fictional status. Critical realists reject both
of these conflations on the grounds that, because both
social structures and human agents possess their own
unique generative mechanisms, one cannot be reduced
to the other.
Traditional RCT methodology is implicitly predicated
upon a downwards conflation of causal explanation in
that, by regarding the intervention as the explanatory
variable, it privileges structural influence over individual
choice. Conversely, given RCTs’ reliance on statistical
averages to identify correlations, the method is simply
not designed to take individual volition into account.
However, Jamal et al.’s proposal for the inclusion of
qualitative empirical strategies to take account of the
role of agency in the production of outcomes means that
the same charge cannot be laid at the door of their con-
ception of realist RCTs.
The third form of conflation, ‘central conflation’, differs
from the first two in that it rejects the reduction of
either structure or agency in favour of their mutual uni-
fication, arguing that they are inseparable and can only
be conceptualised in relation to each other in a ‘duality
of structure’ [24]. ‘Rather than seeing action and struc-
ture as counter-acting elements of a dualism, we should
regard them as the complementary terms of a duality’
([25], p. 58). It is not a matter of trying to explain
human behaviour through the influence of external fac-
tors (as the traditional RCT does), or of explaining be-
haviour entirely in terms of individual volition (as much
qualitative analysis does), but of appreciating ‘how action
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is structured in everyday contexts and how the struc-
tured features of action are, by the very performance of
an action, thereby reproduced’. ([25], p. 56)
Critical realists reject the central elision of structure
and agency on both ontological and methodological
grounds. At an ontological level, Bhaskar [21] empha-
sises ‘the importance of distinguishing, in the most
categorical way, between human action and the social
structure’:
The properties possessed by social forms may be very
different from those possessed by the individuals upon
whose activity they depend. I want to distinguish
sharply then between the genesis of human actions,
lying in the reasons, intentions and plans of human
beings, on the one hand; and the structures governing
the reproduction and transformation of social
activities, on the other (p. 79).
Archer [22] makes the complementary argument that
the reason for distinguishing between human action and
social structure is ‘not simply because ontologically they
are indeed different entities with different properties and
powers, but because methodologically it is necessary to
make the distinction between them in order to examine
their interplay and thus be able to explain why things
are “so and not otherwise” in society’ (p. 64).
Realist evaluation’s elision
While Van Belle et al. may have overstated their case when
they argued that ‘scientific realism holds that mechanisms
are … a function of the interactions between intervention
resources and responses of participants’, their earlier
statement that ‘wide agreement exists that “response to re-
sources” is the defining feature of mechanisms in the work
of Pawson and Tilley’ ([2], p. 2) can be accepted without
contention. Their critique of Jamal et al.’s separation of so-
cial resources from people’s responses is founded on the
particular grounds of Pawson and Tilley’s interpretation of
realism.
Pawson and Tilley [20] derive their conception of
programme mechanisms as involving ‘an interplay be-
tween social resources and participants’ reasoning’ (p. 75)
from their understanding of the composition of social
mechanisms, which they define as being about ‘people’s
choices and the capacities they derive from group mem-
bership’ (p. 66). Pawson and Tilley’s definition of social
mechanisms in general, and programme mechanisms in
particular, as consisting of a combination of structure
(‘the capacities derived from group membership’/‘social
resources’) and agency (‘people’s choices’/‘participants’
reasoning’) stands in stark contrast to the critical realist
insistence that agency and structure are different en-
tities with different properties and powers [26].
Ironically, despite their stated adoption of the assump-
tions underlying realist evaluation, Jamal et al.’s distinction
between agency and social structure is more compatible
with the assumptions of critical realism. Their interpret-
ation of social mechanisms as objective entities that are
analytically distinguishable from human agency has the
benefit of enabling evaluators to examine structure and
agency’s ‘interplay and thus be able to explain why things
are “so and not otherwise”’ ([22], p. 64).
It has to be conceded that Jamal et al. do not fully ar-
ticulate the relationships between the basic components
addressed by realist RCTs. A clearer definition of those
relationships is, therefore, required. To that end, we
commend the model that conceives of observed outcomes
as the result of the interaction of contextual mechanisms,
programme mechanisms and human agency [26].
Configuration or correlation?
Van Belle et al. argue that, in line with notions of caus-
ation traditionally associated with RCTs, Jamal et al. adopt
a successionist mode of explanation which involves the
correlation of variables, whereby one (the dependent
variable) succeeds the other (the explanatory variable). As
Van Belle et al. point out, realism rejects successionist
modes of causal explanation. It does so on the grounds
that they confuse causes with effects. In contrast, depth
realists categorically distinguish empirical regularities
from the mechanisms that generate them [4]. However,
this position does not warrant Van Belle et al.’s rejection
of the concept of ‘variables’, at least as it pertains to out-
come patterns. Because these patterns can be varied by
the introduction of an intervention, and because they are
distinct from the mechanisms that generate them, Jamal
et al.’s focus on their measurement does not necessarily
entail the adoption of an approach ‘that reduces mecha-
nisms … to mere variables’ (p. 4), though their use of de-
scriptors such as ‘mediating variables’ for mechanisms
seems to reflect a vestige of successionist assumptions.
While Van Belle et al. accept that Jamal et al.’s model
involves multiple mechanisms, they argue that the lat-
ters’ discrete treatment of each hypothesised mechanism
fails to take account of the depth realist tenet that out-
comes are the result of causal configurations. This means
that realism’s ‘explanation relies on showing the relation-
ship between context and mechanism’, rather than treating
them as separate strands (p. 4).
Van Belle et al.’s assertion that outcomes result from
causal configurations is a commonly accepted tenet of
depth realism, so far as it pertains to open systems.
However, while causation in open systems is complex,
this does not mean that individual mechanisms are bereft
of distinctive causal powers. Here, we concur with Van
Belle et al.’s assertion that generative mechanisms are not
variables in that, while variation of the configuration of
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mechanisms will lead to variable outcomes, this does
not imply a variation in the intrinsic qualities of the
constituent mechanisms. Mechanisms’ possession of
specific causal properties means that, assuming they
can be isolated from other mechanisms, their powers
can, in principle, be measured. From a critical realist
perspective, this is the focus of experimental science,
and the reason why it has been so successful [4].
As has been previously been pointed out by the
defenders of realist RCTs [27] in response to the accus-
ation that RCT design is inherently positivist [18],
methods do not make assumptions, researchers (and we
might add research methodologists) do. If we consider
Bhaskar’s seminal depth realist examination of the ex-
perimental method in natural science [4], we can see
that the purpose of experimental closure is to prevent as
many mechanisms as possible, apart from the one whose
causal powers are the object of interest, from exerting a
differential influence, so that any regularities observed
can be interpreted as being caused by the mechanism of
interest. It is through this simplification of context that
experimental science is able to identify particular causal
powers. Thus, experimentation entails creating an artifi-
cially controlled environment with the aim testing hy-
potheses about specific causal mechanisms. In other
words, it is concerned with neutralising configurations
as far as possible, rather than treating them as the ob-
jects of investigation per se.
While Bhaskar perceives the social world as necessarily
open and, therefore, not amenable to experimental clos-
ure [21], it has been argued that RCTs can be regarded
as analogous to natural science experiments in that
randomisation, blinding and recruitment of sufficient
numbers to ensure statistical power involves the use of
probability theory to approximate the closed system of
the experiment [16]. To the extent that RCTs can be
regarded as epidemiological proxies that substitute prob-
abilistic controls over extraneous factors for experimen-
tal closure [28], the strategy of developing hypotheses
about specific mechanisms and using statistical methods
to test them would seem to be a viable course to take.
This equation of RCTs with experiments is not entirely
straightforward in that, while RCTs can control for con-
text, their focus tends to remain on the intervention, ra-
ther than specific mechanisms within the intervention.
When addressing complex interventions, which fre-
quently consist of a number of components, this lack of
specific focus can compromise explanatory power [29].
However, experimental designs have been developed to
identify causal mechanisms within the ‘black box’ of in-
terventions [30], including the causal mediation analysis
[31] favoured by Jamal et al., though the degree to which
they are consonant with realist tenets is yet to be fully
established.
Even if we allow that RCTs have the methodological
capacity to impose conditions analogous to those of the
closed experiment, they contain limitations that indi-
cate the need for additional evaluative strategies. First,
trials cannot take into account the causal effects of the
configuration of mechanisms that come into play once
experimental conditions are relaxed. Second, the out-
comes they measure are not simply caused by the social
mechanisms they are examining, but by the interplay
between those mechanisms and the interpretive and
causal powers of human agents [16].
Simplicity and complexity
Noting that RCTs’ requirement for randomisation and
control means that they can only test a few simple
context-mechanism-outcome configurations, Van Belle
et al. conclude that ‘at best, then, the RCT may help
us in assessing the relative contribution of mecha-
nisms to outcome patterns if the causal configuration
is uniform’ (pp. 4–5). Notwithstanding Bonell et al.’s
[28] response to the contrary, we concur with Van
Belle et al., but interpret this circumscribed contribu-
tion to evaluation as extremely useful. It is through
such simplification that the efficacy of an intervention
(relating to its performance under ideal circumstances
[32] can be established. However, precisely because of
their closure and control, trials are far less able to
demonstrate effectiveness (relating to performance
under ordinary circumstances) [32].
While the demonstration of efficacy is a necessary
component of evaluation, it is not a sufficient one, in
that it does not take account of the effect of open
systems where other mechanisms are operating con-
currently [14]. Nor, with their function of describing
rather than explaining ‘demi-regularities’ [33], are
RCTs able to take account of human reasoning [16].
We wish to argue that these weaknesses in the ex-
perimental approach indicate the need for three dis-
tinctive methodological strategies, ‘one designed to
enumerate outcome patterns; one designed to identify
the mechanisms embedded in an intervention and its
social context; and one designed to uncover the experi-
ences, interpretations and responses of the actors in-
volved’ ([34], p. 78).
RCTs can constitute one of these three strategies, in
that they can be used to test efficacy by enumerating
outcome patterns in tightly controlled environments
which minimise (or cancel out) the effects of contextual
mechanisms on outcomes [14, 16].
The second strategy involves the development and
testing of realist hypotheses about the resources and re-
strictions embedded in the intervention and its contexts,
and their relationships. This strategy can be used to build
middle-range theories about processes of causation; model
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the intervention; refine theories to provide explanations
concerning what works for whom in what circumstances;
and inform those introducing efficacious interventions
into open contexts of contextual mechanisms that may
affect their sustained effectiveness [26].
The third strategy involves qualitative investigation de-
signed to uncover how the human agents affected by the
intervention respond to the resources and restrictions it
presents. We contend that this qualitative stage should
not confine itself to examination of the reasoning behind
agents’ responses for the purpose of optimising the mo-
tivational appeal of the intervention. In addition to this
instrumental function, it should also attempt to illumin-
ate people’s experiences of the intervention for the pur-
pose of critically establishing its beneficial or detrimental
effects upon the lives of those affected by it [26].
Conclusion
While our main aim has been to open up the possibility
of realist RCTs as a useful approach to the evaluation of
complex interventions, we do not wish push our argu-
ments too far. There are number of reasons for caution.
First, as Van Belle et al. point out, there is a dearth of
practical examples of realist RCTs; even the exemplar
presented by Jamal et al. is incomplete. There is a lot of
practical and theoretical work yet to be done before a
fully-fledged model of realist RCTs is developed. Not
least, we suspect that such a model will need to be con-
siderably lighter of touch than that currently proposed
by Jamal et al. if it is not to be prohibitively burdensome.
This is a significant issue because if realist trials are to have
an impact on evaluation science, they are going to have to
demonstrate that they are useable as well as useful.
We also do not think that the debate about the relative
merits of realist RCTs versus realist evaluations nested
in RCTs (or perhaps better, RCTs nested in critical realist
evaluations) is settled yet. In our own empirical work re-
lating to palliative care, we have been adopting the three
parallel strategies outlined above [35–38].
Finally, given that the experimental approach to social
systems that RCTs entail is not warranted by Bhaskarian
realism [8], which regards those systems as irreducibly
open, our mapping of RCTs onto critical realism is not
straightforward. Further conversation about this exten-
sion of naturalistic science into the social world is
required.
Notwithstanding these notes of caution, our purpose
in this paper has been to establish the possibility and in-
deed desirability of realist RCTs. In terms of possibility,
we hope that our discussion about the articulation of the
assumptions embedded in realist RCTs with the tenets
of critical realism has demonstrated that trials can be
grounded in a cogent and consonant realist philosophy
of science.
In terms of desirability, we have identified critical realist
RCTs’ potential to overcome the limitations of traditional
trial designs in accounting for the influence of social
context and individual interpretation on the outcomes of
complex interventions. What critical realism promises is a
framework to allow researchers to combine output, process
and experiential data in a complementary fashion that
gives due regard to each piece of the explanatory jigsaw.
Abbreviation
RCT: Randomised controlled trial
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